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MAC_PARTITION(4)       FreeBSD Kernel Interfaces Manual	      MAC_PARTITION(4)

NAME
     mac_partition -- process partition	policy

SYNOPSIS
     To	compile	the process partition policy into your kernel, place the fol-
     lowing lines in your kernel configuration file:

	   options MAC
	   options MAC_PARTITION

     Alternately, to load the process partition	module at boot time, place the
     following line in your kernel configuration file:

	   options MAC

     and in loader.conf(5):

	   mac_partition_load="YES"

DESCRIPTION
     The mac_partition policy module implements	a process partition policy,
     which allows administrators to place running processes into
     ``partitions'', based on their numeric process partition (specified in
     the process's MAC label).	Processes with a specified partition can only
     see processes that	are in the same	partition.  If no partition is speci-
     fied for a	process, it can	see all	other processes	in the system (subject
     to	other MAC policy restrictions not defined in this man page).  No pro-
     visions for placing processes into	multiple partitions are	available.

   Label Format
     Partition labels take on the following format:

	   partition/value

     Where value can be	any integer value or ``none''.	For example:

	   partition/1
	   partition/20
	   partition/none

SEE ALSO
     mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4),
     mac_mls(4), mac_none(4), mac_portacl(4), mac_seeotheruids(4),
     mac_test(4), maclabel(7), mac(9)

HISTORY
     The mac_partition policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was
     developed by the TrustedBSD Project.

AUTHORS
     This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Asso-
     ciates Labs, the Security Research	Division of Network Associates Inc.
     under DARPA/SPAWAR	contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS''), as part of the
     DARPA CHATS research program.

BUGS
     While the MAC Framework design is intended	to support the containment of
     the root user, not	all attack channels are	currently protected by entry
     point checks.  As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on,
     in	isolation, to protect against a	malicious privileged user.

FreeBSD	11.1			 July 25, 2015			  FreeBSD 11.1
NAME | SYNOPSIS | DESCRIPTION | SEE ALSO | HISTORY | AUTHORS | BUGS

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